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Abstract A fundamental requirement for nodes in ad
hoc and sensor networks is the ability to correctly de-
termine their neighborhood. Many applications, proto-
cols, and network wide functions rely on correct neigh-
borhood discovery. Malicious nodes that taint neigh-
borhood information using wormholes can significantly
disrupt the operation of ad hoc networks. Protocols
that depend only on cryptographic techniques (e.g,
authentication and encryption) may not be able to
detect or prevent such attacks. In this paper we propose
SECUND, a protocol for creating a SECUre Neigh-
borhooD, that makes use of discrepancies in routing
hop count information to detect “true” neighbors and
remove those links to nodes that appear to be neigh-
bors, but are not really neighbors. SECUND is simple,
localized and needs no special hardware, localization,
or synchronization. We evaluate SECUND using sim-
ulations and demonstrate its effectiveness in the pres-
ence of multiple and multi-ended wormholes. Lastly,
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we present approaches to improve the efficiency of the
SECUND process.
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1 Introduction
Neighborhood discovery in ad hoc and sensor net-
works is the process by which network nodes deter-
mine their neighbor nodes. Neighborhood discovery
is a basic function that is a prerequisite to enabling
multi-hop communication, access control, transmission
scheduling, and other protocols for network operation.
A short survey of neighborhood discovery in ad hoc
networks is available in [1]. A conclusion in this paper
is that securing the neighborhood discovery process is
a difficult and open problem. In ad hoc networks the
nodes typically try to discover their neighbors simply
by broadcasting a neighbor discovery request. Each
node that hears the request responds with a neighbor
discovery reply. An adversary may try to thwart neigh-
borhood discovery to disrupt the network operation by
(a) preventing neighbors from discovering each other
by jamming or (b) creating a false “neighbor relation-
ship” between nodes that are not really in range of
each other. The latter can be accomplished by spoofing
neighbor discovery messages or by installing worm-
holes [2] in the network. This latter problem is the focus
of this paper.
A wormhole (see Fig. 1) can be constructed by an
adversary by simply copying all packets (signals) from
one location (M1) in the network and replaying them
at another location (M2) that is located several hops
416 Mobile Netw Appl (2012) 17:415–430
Fig. 1 Wormhole and types of neighbors
away. All the reply packets (signals) from location (M2)
will also be captured and replayed at location (M1).
Consequently, nodes that are located in M1’s range
(e.g., A and D) will believe that they are neighbors
to nodes that are located in M2’s range (e.g., B and
F). In effect, the wormhole has created several bogus
“direct” links between nodes in the network. In Fig. 1,
the links A − B, A − F, D − B, and D − F are bogus
links. Multiple wormholes and multi-ended wormholes
can worsen the situation. Standard security techniques
such as encryption and authentication cannot detect
the wormhole attack or identify the bogus links as the
transceivers M1 and M2 can simply relay the encrypted
or authenticated packets without changing them.
In this paper we consider the neighborhood discov-
ery problem in ad hoc networks subject to wormhole at-
tacks. Jamming attacks are not considered in this work.
Most of the previous work (described in Section 2)
on wormhole detection requires precise and accurate
information about the location of nodes, the time
of packet transmission and synchronization between
nodes, or the use of special hardware (e.g., directional
antennas). Further, the proposed protocols/algorithms
must be applied between all pairs of nodes to detect
the existence of a wormhole. In large networks with
high node degrees, this can result in significant over-
head and delay. Finally, detection of the existence of a
wormhole is not sufficient. It is necessary to correctly
identify the bogus links and distinguish them from real
links between neighbors (i.e., effectively and efficiently
remove the wormhole without adversely impacting the
real links).
In this paper we propose SECUND,1 a protocol for
creating a SECUre NeighborhooD that can discover
1In botany, the word “secund” refers to having elements on one
side only—for example, leaves on one side of a branch—and not
on both sides. The SECUND protocol ensures that the final list
of neighbors of a node are those on the same side as the node,
not the other side of a wormhole if it exists.
true neighbors, distinguish between true and purported
neighbors, and detect and remove wormhole links if
they exist in the network. Compared to other secure
neighbor verification or discovery protocols, SECUND
is simple, localized, needs no special hardware, local-
ization, or synchronization. SECUND is based on prin-
ciples developed in [3] where we presented a protocol
called DeWorm to detect the existence of wormholes.
DeWorm is an on-demand protocol that makes use of
routing hop count discrepancies, determined by nodes
along a route in a sliding fashion, to detect wormholes
that may be somewhere along a route. SECUND also
makes use of routing hop count discrepancies, but its
goal is to efficiently check links between every pair
of nodes for existence of wormholes and to remove
only the tainted links to the extent possible. SECUND
can also detect and remove two-ended and multi-ended
wormholes (not considered in [3]).
Using hop count discrepancies to detect the exis-
tence of a wormhole exploits a basic characteristic
of wormholes and consequently it needs no special
hardware. The basic characteristic that is exploited is
the fact that a wormhole must span multiple hops in
order to have a significant impact on the network. Thus,
routes from a source to a destination that avoid bogus
links should be significantly longer than the routes that
make use of bogus links. However, when this is inde-
pendently employed by all nodes, there can be several
false positives (i.e., a wormhole is flagged as existing
when it actually does not). With SECUND, the number
of false positives can be significantly reduced by mutual
checks for existence of wormholes between pairs of
nodes. The number of such checks can be drastically
reduced (without significantly impacting the detection
rate of wormholes or increasing the false positives)
when nodes follow specific rules that enable them to
omit such checks. When a wormhole is detected in the
vicinity of a node, removing only those bogus links
that have been created by the wormhole is challenging.
SECUND uses a novel classification of different types
of neighbors (see Section 3) to remove bogus links and
a sequence of mutual checks to reduce the number of
legal links removed.
To the best of our knowledge, SECUND is the
first protocol that employs cooperation between honest
nodes to reduce the overhead associated with detect-
ing the existence of wormholes and creating a secure
neighborhood. The heuristics suggested here to reduce
overhead could be used by protocols that use pro-
tected location information (which is the straightfor-
ward way of detecting physical layer wormholes) to
secure neighborhoods. This is also the first protocol, to
our knowledge, that explicitly addresses the removal of
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bogus links without removing legal links. Our simula-
tions show that the proposed protocol can successfully
detect and remove most wormhole links. Very few legal
links are mistakenly removed. The cost associated with
SECUND is the overhead measured by the number of
route acquisitions (which we show is fairly low).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 3, we describe SECUND in detail including the
mutual cooperation between nodes to reduce the over-
head of securing the neighborhood. Section 4 presents
the results of a simulation based performance evalua-
tion. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
A survey of neighborhood discovery and neighborhood
discovery protocols are presented in [1]. According to
[1], researchers consider any wormhole defense mech-
anism as relevant to secure neighborhood discovery.
Thus, here, we classify protocols for wormhole detec-
tion based on the approach they rely upon (even if
they do not explicitly consider secure neighborhood
discovery).
Location based approaches have the best ability to
secure the neighborhood if the locations of nodes are
securely exchanged and the general transmission range
is known. In location-based approaches, a location-
aware sender and receiver will securely exchange
their location information. Then, in order to detect
whether a wormhole connects them, the nodes will
check if packets have traveled the distance between
them using only a few hops and/or in a short time. In
[4] end-to-end wormhole detection is proposed. Based
on geographic information exchanged, the source node
estimates the minimum hop count to the destination.
The source compares the hop count value received
from the reply packet with this estimated value. If the
received value is less than that estimated, the corre-
sponding route is marked as if a wormhole exists. Hu
et al. [2, 5], suggested the use of geographical leashes to
detect wormholes. A geographical leash requires each
node to know its own location and all nodes to have
loosely time synchronized clocks. The nodes need to
securely exchange location information. A sender node
can then ensure that the receiver is within a certain dis-
tance and detect discrepancies therein. Location based
protocols usually require the nodes to be equipped with
GPS or employ some other positioning technology. The
problems with this approach are the need for having the
hardware and/or infrastructure in place to accurately
determine the positions of nodes and the fact that many
positioning schemes may still not provide the required
location accuracy in all environments (e.g., indoor and
urban areas).
Time-based protocols, in general, are based on accu-
rate time measurements or require the nodes to have
tightly synchronized clocks. They work best with in-
band wormholes that encapsulate packets between the
wormhole nodes, but take the same number of hops
otherwise. The idea here is that an in-band worm-
hole must cause noticeable delay for the traffic that
passes through it. For instance, in [6], timing associated
with existing MAC layer acknowledgments are used
to detect a wormhole. In [7], the authors proposed a
transmission time based mechanism (TTM) to detect
wormholes. The protocol requires the computation of
the transmission time between every two successive
nodes along the established path during route setup.
Time based protocols require some approximations as
the node that is in charge of detection has to account
for the processing and propagation delay times. More-
over, in ad hoc networks, the MAC protocol may also
cause some unpredictable delays. More importantly,
these protocols are not capable of detecting out-of-
band physical layer wormholes. In such wormholes, a
packet suffers only the propagation delay which could
be small for wormholes using high-speed links. In [8],
researchers showed that it is impossible to secure the
neighborhood with general time-based protocols if ad-
versarial nodes are able to relay messages with a delay
below a certain threshold. Note that this threshold
is what is typically used by such protocols to detect
wormholes. A similar conclusion was also reached by
Chiang et al. [9].
Distance bounding approaches use estimates of the
physical distance between purported neighbors to en-
sure that such a distance is not longer than the max-
imum allowable distance (e.g., by using the farthest
distance reachable by a node operating at its maximum
transmission power). Many techniques have been used
to estimate the distance between the nodes. Some re-
searchers relied on the signal round trip time multiplied
by the signal propagation time (speed of light) [1].
A secure neighbor verification protocol for wireless
sensor networks is proposed in [10]. This protocol is
distributed and relied on the estimated distance be-
tween nodes. They require each node to be equipped
with a microsecond precision clock and two network
interfaces: a radio-frequency and an acoustic inter-
face. Other approaches also use some special hard-
ware such as directional antennas [11], special RF [12],
or ultrasound [13] to estimate such distance bounds.
These protocols cannot be easily applicable to any ad
hoc network because they add expense, complexity,
and need for special customization. Moreover, some
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of these protocols have their own specific weakness
(e.g., uncertainty in location and varying propagation
conditions) and cannot always ensure the detection
of wormholes. Also it is sometimes possible for the
attacker to use adversarial nodes that are equipped
with the same hardware used by the network nodes to
deceive a detection protocol.
Protocols that do not rely on location, timing, or tight
synchronization can be classified into centralized and
distributed approaches. Centralized approaches rely on
gathering information such as statistics of node degrees
and visual analysis of the network connectivity graph
and processing them at a central entity. In [14], the net-
work is reconstructed using multi-dimensional scaling
and a wormhole that exists is detected by visualizing
the anomalies introduced by the attack. Poovendran
and Lazos [15] presented a graph theoretic framework
for modeling wormhole links and derive the necessary
and sufficient conditions to detect and defend against
wormhole attacks. Qian et al. [16] presented a scheme
to detect wormhole attacks based on statistical analysis.
Centralized topology information was used in [17] to
detect wormholes. The protocol looks for forbidden
substructures in the connectivity graph that should not
be present in a legal connectivity graph. This also re-
quires the network to be highly connected. Detection
requires a specific number of independent neighbors
for the nodes connected through a wormhole to exist.
It is always preferable to have the process for detecting
and removing wormholes decentralized or distributed
in ad hoc networks—centralized approaches are thus
not very attractive.
Decentralized or distributed approaches include
protocols that are based on connectivity and neigh-
borhood information. These are the closest in scope
to SECUND—our proposed protocol. Here nodes will
exchange information such as node degrees or the list
of one-hop and/or two-hop neighbors. Based on the
collected information, the existence or not of a worm-
hole is determined. In general, the information should
always be locally collected and/or disseminated, that is
between a node and its one or at most two-hop neigh-
bors. The node degree is used to detect wormholes in
[18]. The assumption here is that the wormhole will in-
crease the number of one-hop neighbors of a node and
if this number is greater than some threshold (e.g., the
average node degree) then there must be a wormhole.
If however the wormhole connects a single node with
another node that is far away, the node degree only
changes by one and the wormhole will not be detected.
Another possibility could be to place the wormhole
between nodes that have a node degree less than the
average which will prevent the wormhole’s detection.
But the damage to the network is comparable to any
other wormhole. The protocol suggests an approximate
removal process for a set of suspicious links that may
however completely isolate some nodes from the net-
work. In [19], an approach similar to [18] was presented.
The assumption made is that the wormhole will sig-
nificantly increase the number of one-hop neighbors.
Nodes are assumed to be uniformly and densely de-
ployed with no links changed or added. Each node will
count the number of nodes that are two-hops away and
the idea is that this number grows under a wormhole
attack. In [20], the network topology is assumed to
be static, links are assumed to be bidirectional, the
topology is dense with every two neighbors assumed to
have a common neighbor. The idea employed here is
that the wormhole must change the topology structure
of the network. The authors computed a so-called edge-
clustering coefficient related to this change. A worm-
hole node is detected by one of its neighbors if that
neighbor cannot reach one of the wormhole neighbors
without using that node. However, it is possible to come
up with many scenarios with wormholes that will not
satisfy any of the necessary conditions for this approach
to detect the wormhole. For instance, if the wormhole
connects a group of nodes (≥ 2) with another group of
nodes, which is the most common form of wormhole,
then the protocol will not detect the wormhole.
3 SECUND
In this section, we describe how SECUND works. We
will first describe the detection of the existence of a
wormhole without regard to the percentage of false
positives or the amount of overhead. Then we will
consider the use of mutual checks to reduce the per-
centage of false positives and the use of rules to allow
certain nodes to omit checks for wormholes, thereby
reducing the overhead. Finally, we discuss the problem
of identifying types of neighbors and removal of bogus
links.
3.1 Network model and notation
We start by describing the network and the attack
model used. Consider an arbitrary ad hoc or sensor net-
work consisting of n nodes represented by the ordered
set Q. Let the set of one-hop neighbors of a node A
be NA, that is, NA =
{
A1, A2, ...AkA
}
, where kA is the
number of neighbor replies received by node A. For the
discussion in this section we will assume the existence of
a single two-end wormhole. The wormhole equipment
M1 ↔ M2 is defined as two extra nodes M1 and M2
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that are not part of the network, (i.e., not elements
of Q). Here we assume a closed wormhole where M1
and M2 are not visible to their neighbors (i.e., they
do not advertise their node IDs or MAC addresses)
and that the wormhole is an out-of-band physical layer
wormhole that uses a high speed link to connect M1
and M2. Detecting such wormholes is considered to be
extremely difficult [21].
The set of one-hop neighbors of M1 and M2 will
be NM1 and NM2 , respectively. Note that by definition,
every node in NM1 is connected to all the nodes in
NM2 via the wormhole and vice versa. Thus NA, the
one-hop neighbor set of node A includes nodes both
within transmission range and on the other side of the
wormhole if A is in the transmission range of the worm-
hole. Let NˆA be the set of “true” one hop neighbors
of A. Then N∗A = NA − NˆA will be the set of nodes
that are fake neighbors of A due to the wormhole.
With reference to Fig. 1, NA = {B, C, D, F} and NˆA =
{C, D} and N∗A = {F, B}. Clearly, N∗A = NM2 . The fake
neighbors of A that are in N∗A are classified as Type
1 neighbors. The set NˆA comprises of nodes that may
also belong to NM1 —these are called Type 2 neighbors
(e.g., D). The subset of nodes in NˆA like C, that are not
in NM1 are called Type 3 neighbors. Let the route from
any node X to any node Y be RX−Y and |RX−Y | be the
length of the route in number of hops.
3.2 Detection of wormhole existence
Node A will first determine if it is in the vicinity
(within the transmission range) of a wormhole The
process used here is similar to that described in [3].
The basic idea here is to find alternative paths to a
target node that do not pass through the wormhole.
These alternative paths will be significantly different
in length compared to the path that goes through the
wormhole making use of the wormhole link—otherwise
the wormhole will not attract large amounts of traffic.
If node A is in the vicinity of a wormhole, one or more
nodes in NA will be on the other side of the wormhole.
Suppose that B ∈ N∗A is a fake neighbor of A and that
the wormhole is η hops long. If a node X ∈ NˆA were to
find a route to some neighbor of B that is not a neighbor
of A (called the target T) avoiding all nodes ∈ N∗A, such
a route must be at least η hops long (since a route that
goes through the wormhole has to include some node in
N∗A = NM2 , the wormhole is avoided and the alternate
route must be at least as long as the wormhole itself).
Implementing this idea is not trivial since node A does
not know the composition of N∗A. So node X avoids
using all nodes in NA which will include all nodes in N∗A.
But X itself may be part of N∗A. This makes it necessary
for all nodes in NA to repeat this process. Further, it
is also possible that T ∈ NM1 since it is a neighbor of
B which is in the vicinity of the wormhole. Thus, it
could be closer to A than B. All of these are taken
into account in the algorithm to detect existence of a
wormhole. The basic algorithm is given in Figs. 2 and
3. A description of all the steps with some discussion is
presented next.
SECUND steps
1. Node A will discover its one-hop neighbors by
broadcasting a “hello” message. Cryptographic
techniques (e.g., authentication) are used to pre-
vent malicious nodes from sending fake replies.
2. Node A receives replies from its neighbors and
verifies their authenticity. Neighbors could be el-
ements of either NˆA or N∗A. At this time, A cannot
distinguish between these sets.
3. Node A wishes to determine if B is a true neighbor.
A asks B to provide its one-hop neighbor list NB.
We refer to B as the neighbor under examination
(see Fig. 2).
4. Node A picks some node ∈ NB − NA and marks it
as the target node T.
5. Node A will ask all its one-hop neighbors (real and
purported) to find the shortest route to T. Those
routes RX−T :
(i) cannot be direct (must pass through another
node) and
(ii) must avoid the one-hop neighbors NA and NB
of both A and B.
6. Nodes in NA reply to A with the length |RS−T | of
their shortest routes to the target node T.
7. Node A employs Select(route) (see Fig. 3) to select
a route RS−T that will be compared with a route
that may pass through the wormhole, if a wormhole
exists in the vicinity. The route that passes through
the wormhole should be 3 hops—from the neigh-
bor of A to A, from A to B and from B to T).
Using Select(route) eliminates extremely long route
outliers while ensuring that a route that is η hops
longer than the wormhole route is not missed.
8. If the difference between the length of the selected
route and the wormhole route is greater than a
threshold η then SECUND declares there is worm-
hole in the vicinity. We discuss picking the right
value of η next.
Selection of η The value of η is not known a priori,
but while implementing security in the network, the
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Fig. 2 The initial detection algorithm
administrative entity can decide what it should be. Typ-
ically, the longer a wormhole, the greater the damage
it inflicts by attracting more traffic. With η = 2 even
short wormholes (2 hops) can be detected. However,
the simulation results will show that the number of
false positives will be high. Using η ≥ 3 reduces false
positives but short wormholes (less than 3 hops) may
escape detection. η = 2 or 3 provides the best tradeoff
between detection rate and false positives as we see
from the results later. We now consider some scenarios
illustrating how SECUND works.
No wormhole In the example in Fig. 4 nodes A and B
are real neighbors—there is no wormhole in this case.
Node A wants to check if node B is a real neighbor.
Node A picks node F, a neighbor of B but not a
neighbor of A, as the target node and asks its neighbors
C, D, and X to find routes to node F. The lengths of
these routes will be 4, 2, and 5 hops. Note that the nodes
have to avoid the one hop neighbors of nodes A and B
in their routes to F. Node A will select one of these
routes (for now let us assume it is the longest one of
5 hops). The route from X to F through A will be 3
hops. If 5 − 3 < η then node A will decide that node B
is a real neighbor. In some cases, |RX−T | − 3 ≥ η if the
topology is sparse and there is a false positive.
Fig. 3 The route selection algorithm
Fig. 4 Detection operation without wormhole
With wormhole Cases where nodes A and B are con-
nected through a wormhole are shown in Figs. 5 and
6. In Fig. 5, A ∈ NM1 and it has at least one neighbor
B ∈ NM2 . The target node must be a neighbor of B
but not of A. Thus, there are two possibilities for the
target node in this case. An example of the first is node
F ∈ NˆB − NM2 in Fig. 5. Neighbors of A avoid other
nodes in NA and all nodes in NB when they try to reach
F. Since all nodes in NM2 are included in NA and all
nodes in NM1 are included in NB, all the wormhole links
will be avoided. True neighbors of A will have routes
to F that are longer than 3 hops by at least η and the
wormhole will be detected. For instance, node D, which
is a true neighbor of node A cannot use nodes B or X
to reach the target node F and will use the long route
shown in Fig. 5. In the second case, the target node is
an element of NM1 but outside the range of A (e.g.,
node E in Fig. 6). In this case, true neighbors of A will
find short routes to E, but purported neighbors ∈ NM2
will have long routes to E (e.g., node X is Fig. 6). To
conclude, in either case, some neighbor of A will report
a route whose length exceeds 3 + η and the wormhole
is detected. A detailed example and analysis of a grid
network with a two-ended wormhole is provided in the
Appendix.
Selection of route The algorithm used by node A to
find RS−T is Select(RX−T) which is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 5 Detection operation with wormhole—case 1
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Fig. 6 Detection operation with wormhole—case 2
Node A creates a sorted list of route lengths from its
neighbors to T (excluding replies from neighbors that
do not have routes to the target node). Node A picks
a route (if it exists) that is smaller than the longest
route by not more than η. Otherwise the longest route
is picked. It is the length of this picked route that is
used to determine the existence of the wormhole. We
have tested other methods for Select(RX−T) (see [3]
for a longer discussion). Using the longest route has a
better detection rate especially for short wormholes but
increases the percentage of false positives for randomly
distributed networks. Using the average length of all
routes reduced false positives but also reduced the
detection percentage. The method in Fig. 3 provides the
best performance.
3.3 Improving the detection process
We present approaches to reduce false positives and to
reduce the overall number of checks that must be per-
formed between supposed neighbors in the network.
Reducing false positives False positives can occur in
two ways - first when there is no wormhole and the
topology is sparse resulting a long route to the tar-
get and second when node A tries to check for the
existence of a wormhole between itself and a Type 3
neighbor (see Fig. 1). In the latter case, nodes ∈ N∗A
will find long routes to a Type 3 neighbor. The example
below illustrates why this is the case.
Wormhole exists in the vicinity of A, but does not con-
nect A and B As shown in Fig. 7a, when A checks its
link to B for existence of a wormhole, a bogus neighbor
of A such as X ∈ N∗A will find a long route to a target
node (e.g., E). This will flag the link between A and B
as being potentially corrupted by a wormhole resulting
in a false positive. This problem exists when B is either
a Type 2 neighbor or a Type 3 neighbor. As described
below, this problem can be addressed through mutual
checks if B is a Type 3 neighbor.
Mutual detection We have found that mutual detec-
tion (i.e., A checking if B is a true neighbor and B
checking if A is a true neighbor) reduces the percent-
Fig. 7 False positives and mutual checks with type 3 neighbors
age of false positives significantly. A wormhole will be
suspected to exist if and only if both A and B discover
their links to be connected through a wormhole. When
there is no wormhole, the target nodes for nodes A and
B (see Fig. 4) when they perform mutual checks will
be different. In most cases, even if A marks node B as
connected through a wormhole, B will not or vice versa.
Of course there will still be topologies where both A
and B will still flag each other as connected through
a wormhole, but this fraction is an order of magnitude
smaller as shown in Section 4.
Mutual detection also helps when B is a Type 3
neighbor but A is in the vicinity of a wormhole. Even if
node A in Fig. 7a flags its link to node B as bogus, node
B will not flag its link to node A as shown in Fig. 7b.
Note that B has no neighbors ∈ NM2 that would find
a route to a target node such as C in Fig. 7b. Thus, if
a neighbor of A such as C ∈ NˆA is picked, routes to
C will be short. If a target node is picked in N∗A (for
instance X), there will likely be nodes in NM1 like G
that are not neighbors of either A or B that will find
short routes to X. Thus false positives are reduced and
Type 3 neighbors are correctly identified most of the
time. Exceptions will exist when the network is sparse.
At this point, simply using the detection scheme will
not be able to distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2
neighbors.
Reducing the number of checks If every node checks
each of its neighbors to detect the presence of a worm-
hole, a large overhead and delay can result, especially
in dense networks with high average node degree. The
question then is whether every node must check links
with all of its neighbors or some nodes can be exempt
from applying the detection process. Without any for-
mal proof, we argue that the following simple rules for
checking the existence of wormholes can be adopted
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eliminating a large number of unnecessary checks. The
efficacy of these rules are verified by simulations in
Section 4.
1. If node A checks its link with node B and no
wormhole is discovered, node B need not check its
link with node A.
2. If node A checks its link with node B and a
wormhole is discovered, node B must check its link
with node A. This ensures that false positives are
reduced as discussed previously.
3. If node A has checked its link to node B AND vice
versa, no wormhole is discovered, and any node C
is a neighbor of both A and B, nodes A and B need
not check their links with node C, and vice-versa.
The first two rules are based on the mutual detection
process described above. The third rule is based on
the following reasoning. The detection process simply
determines the existence of a wormhole in the vicinity
of a node A (see Fig. 7a and the related discussion).
The fact that A was unable to find a wormhole when
it checked its link with B AND vice versa implies that
there is no wormhole in the vicinity of A or B. If C is a
neighbor of both A and B, it cannot be on the other side
of a wormhole since neither of the two nodes detected
a wormhole.
One may pose the situation shown in Fig. 8 to be
problematic, where node A has two neighbors X and
B ∈ N∗A. What if X checks its link with B and finds no
wormhole? One of the characteristics of the detection
process is that it cannot distinguish between Type 1 and
Type 2 neighbors. Since both A and B are neighbors of
X, when X checks its link with B, it will ask A to find
a route to a target node (say G) and this will reveal the
presence of the wormhole since A has to avoid all nodes
in NM1 and NM2 .
More aggressive approaches may result in reduc-
ing the wormhole detection rates. For instance, we
could exempt all one hop neighbors of nodes that
did not detect a wormhole from checks. However, if
the wormhole is only connecting exactly one node A
with another node B located several hops away (see
Fig. 9), both nodes A and B, may never check for the
Fig. 8 Wormhole connecting single node with two nodes
Fig. 9 Wormhole connecting single nodes
wormhole as one of their neighbors that is not within
the wormhole range could have ruled out a wormhole.
Similarly, it is not a good idea to exempt all other
neighbors from checking links to a node if one of its
neighbors did not detect a wormhole. For instance, in
Fig. 9, if C did not detect a wormhole when it checks its
link to A, which is true, then B may also not check its
link to A even though there is a wormhole in between.
By including the condition that B has to also be a
neighbor of C, this possibility is averted.
3.4 Removal of bogus links
Detecting the existence of wormholes in the network
is an important step. However, another crucial process
is to remove the links created by the wormhole. Note
that a wormhole that connects m1 nodes ∈ NM1 with
m2 nodes ∈ NM2 results in 2m1m2 bogus unidirectional
links. Even if one of these links is not removed it
may still cause damage by attracting traffic. Many of
the available wormhole defense mechanisms ignore the
removal of the wormhole connected links or use tech-
niques that may remove many legal links. As previously
described, the detection process only flags the existence
of a wormhole. A link between both Type 1 neighbors
and Type 2 neighbors will be flagged as corrupted by
a wormhole as confirmed by mutual checks. However,
mutual checks between Type 3 neighbors allows them
to identify the fact that they are not connected through
a wormhole. The challenge then is to distinguish be-
tween Type 1 and Type 2 neighbors to avoid removing
legal links between Type 2 neighbors.
The algorithm Removal() used by nodes to decide
the removal of the links is shown in Fig. 10. Only if
a node A detects the existence of a wormhole when
it checks the link between itself and node B, then all
neighbors of A and B (i.e., all nodes in NA ∪ NB) will
use the algorithm in Fig. 10. The algorithm works as
follows. Node A will ask all its neighbors that are not
part of NB to find routes to neighbors in NB that are not
part of NA one-by-one. If at any point, routes are found
to be very long (similar to Detection() in Fig. 2), the
process stops. Then B is flagged as a Type 1 neighbor,
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Fig. 10 Wormhole removal algorithm
and the link is removed. If not, node B is flagged as a
Type 2 neighbor.
Why does this work? Consider a Type 1 neighbor B
of node A (see Fig. 11). Node A can have neighbors
in NA − NB that are on either side of the wormhole.
This is also the case with node B. This is the reason
why nodes in NA − NB should find routes to nodes
in NB − NA one-by-one. Eventually, a long route is
discovered. For example, node H ∈ NˆA will find a long
route to K ∈ NˆB or node X ∈ N∗A will find a long route
to E ∈ N∗B. It is not sufficient to pick any one node in
NB − NA as it is possible that NA − NB has nodes on
only one side or the other of the wormhole. In the case
of a Type 2 neighbor B (see Fig. 12), nodes in NB − NA
and NA − NB are both constrained to be on the same
side as nodes A and B. Any neighbor of A that belongs
to N∗A will also belong to N
∗
B since they are both on the
same side of the wormhole. Thus, routes from nodes in
NA − NB to nodes in NB − NA will very likely be short
(e.g., from node C to node D in Fig. 12).
A question that arises here is why do we not use this
process for detection itself? The reason for not using
this algorithm is that this results in a large number
of false positives when there is no wormhole in the
network. (That is, when only nodes in NA − NB find
routes to nodes in NB − NA one-by-one, it is likely
that some outlying long route exists flagging it as a
wormhole). We observed that the false positives can be
Fig. 11 Identification of type 1 neighbor
Fig. 12 Identification of type 2 neighbor
as large as 35% compared to 1% using the Detection()
process mutually between nodes. Thus Removal() is
employed only when a wormhole is detected and after
mutual detection has been employed to eliminate Type
3 neighbors. We also observed from numerical results
that using Removal() mutually between two nodes A
and B can reduce the number of legal links removed.
3.5 Other issues
If a critical node (if this node is removed, the network
will be partitioned) exists in the the network, then the
Detection() process will not work. Figure 13a shows an
example of a critical node in a network. Methods of
detecting critical nodes and addressing this problem are
discussed in [3] and [23]. Another situation that may
result in a lower detection rate is when a node A has no
neighbors in NM2 and the target that is picked is a bogus
neighbor of B in NM1 . This situation has a probability
that depends on the range of the wormhole and the
fraction of neighbors of B that are not neighbors of A
on either side of the wormhole. These two issues are re-
lated to sparse networks. We evaluate the performance
of SECUND as a function of the average node degree
in Section 4.
While the number of legal links removed will be
small (as shown in Section 4), the impact of removing
a very small number of legal links can be expected to
be minimal. For example, in Fig. 13b, if the link from
A to B is removed, node A may be able to use node C
Fig. 13 a Critical node. b Removal of legal links
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to reach Q without an increase in the number of hops.
In some cases, a few additional hops may be required.
Finally, while we have not explicitly described protocols
that will use Removal() (and employ mutual checks
and exchange of information), one can expect this to
operate in a manner similar to the detection process.
4 Performance evaluation
4.1 Simulations
The important performance metrics for secure neigh-
bor creation are: the percentage of correct wormhole
detection, the percentage of false positives, the percent-
age of wormhole links removed, and the percentage of
legal links removed by mistake. We have considered
two different node distribution models: (1) grid distri-
bution with perturbations and (2) random distribution.
In the grid case, nodes are located in a perturbed
20 × 20 grid. The coordinates of each node xi and y j
were randomly chosen using uniform random variables
in the ranges (100i − p100, 100i + p100) and (100 j −
p100, 100 j + p100), respectively, where p is the per-
turbation parameter and i = 1, ...20 and j = 1, ...20 (in
our simulations, p = 0.2). For the random node dis-
tribution, the coordinates of the nodes (xi, yi) for i =
1, 2, ...200 were independently and randomly chosen
in the range from 100 m to 2,000 m using a uniform
[100–2,000] random number generator. As in [3], we
also investigated SECUND with two link connectivity
models: (1) the commonly employed unit disk graph
(UDG) and (2) the quasi unit disk graph (quasi-UDG).
The quasi-UDG connectivity model is described in [22].
Only results with the UDG are shown here for brevity.
The results with the quasi-UDG connectivity model are
very similar. To change the average node degree, the
transmission range of the nodes was varied from 110 m
to 160 m. The simulation model was programmed in C
and the model uses the DSR routing protocol and node
distribution models from ns-2. For statistical validation
the simulations were repeated 50 to 100 times with
confidence intervals of 95%. SECUND was evaluated
for networks without any wormhole, with two-ended
wormholes, and multi-ended wormholes.
Two-ended wormholes A two-ended wormhole con-
nects groups of nodes from one location in the net-
work to another group of nodes located several hops
away (wormholes with different lengths are tested). As
shown in Fig. 14, two separate wormholes are created
in the network such that the ranges of the wormhole
transceivers do not overlap. That is, each node in M1’s
Fig. 14 Two-ended regular wormhole
(M3’s) range is only connected to every node in M2’s
(M4’s) area and vice versa. Let mi be the number of
nodes in the range of wormhole transceiver Mi. The
number of unidirectional links created by wormhole
M1 ↔ M2 is 2m1m2. Note that two nodes A ∈ NM1 and
B ∈ NM2 have two links between between them A →
B and B → A. For the two wormholes shown in Fig. 14,
the number of bogus links created is (2 × 4 × 3) +
(2 × 4 × 3) = 48.
Multi-ended wormhole In this case the wormhole will
be connecting nodes located in many different ar-
eas. In the example shown in Fig. 15, each node
located near any wormhole transceiver will be con-
nected to all nodes located at the other transceivers.
Fig. 15 Multi-end wormhole
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Table 1 False positives without mutual checks
η 2 3 4 5
Grid 7.190 0.489 0.038 0.0172
Random 11.216 1.699 0.281 0.092
For instance, every node in NM1 will be connected
to every node in NM2 , NM3 , and NM4 . In general,
for a n-ended wormhole the number of links created
will be:
∑n−1
i=1
[
mi ·
(∑n−1
j=1, j=i m j+1
)]
. For the example
in Fig. 15 the number of links created by the 4-ended
wormhole is 4 (3 + 4 + 3) + 3(4 + 4 + 3) + 4(4 + 3 +
3) + 3(4 + 3 + 4) = 146.
4.2 Results without wormholes
We first simulated networks without wormholes and
ran the Detection() and Removal() algorithms to deter-
mine the percentage of false positives and legal links re-
moved by mistake. The false positive rate is determined
by the fraction of instances where the Detection()
process flags a wormhole as existing when it does not.
We first look at the false positive rate when without
mutual checks (i.e., A runs Detection() but B does not
when A checks to see if B is a neighbor). Simulation
results shown in Table 1 indicate that the false positive
rate can be fairly high for small values of η. This is
because it is possible for some nodes to only find routes
to the target that are longer than the route through
A and B by more than 2 hops. However, with η = 3
the percentage of false positives is less than 2%. When
Detection() is run by both nodes (mutual checks), the
false positive rates fall drastically as seen in Table 2. It
is close to 0 for grid distributions of nodes and less than
0.2% for randomly distributed nodes for η = 3. More
false positives occur with randomly distributed nodes
since nodes may have relatively long routes to reach the
target node.
The percentage of legal links removed by mistake
(number of links removed/total number of links) when
there is no wormhole, is a very important performance
metric for secure neighbor discovery protocols. Table 3
shows the percentage of legal links removed by mis-
take for both grid and randomly distributed nodes for
different values of η. The results show that SECUND
removes none or very few legal links. Note that in this
Table 2 Percentage of false positives with mutual checks
η 2 3 4 5
Grid 1.299 0.006 0 0
Random 2.884 0.196 0 0
Table 3 Percentage of legal links removed by mistake
η 2 3 4 5
Grid 0.468 0.001 0 0
Random 1.033 0.061 0 0
case there are no Type 1 or Type 2 neighbors which
makes the process less complicated.
4.3 Results with wormholes
In this section, we present simulation results when
two-ended and multi-ended wormholes are present in
networks. We first present results of the percentage of
legal links removed—in comparison with results from
the previous section. Next we present detection rates as
a function of wormhole length and node degree.
4.3.1 Removal of bogus and legal links
We simulated wormholes with d ≥ 5 hops and con-
sidered the fraction of legal links removed and the
fraction of bogus links removed for different values of
η. In the case of both grid and random distribution of
nodes and for both two-ended and multi-ended worm-
holes, η = 3 provides almost 100% removal of bogus
links and removal of less than 1% of legal links. Even
for η = 2, the performance can be considered to be
very good. As η increases to 5, the fraction of bogus
links removed drops to around 80% with random node
distributions and multi-ended wormholes where it be-
comes more difficult to distinguish between Type 1 and
Type 2 neighbors for larger η values. These results are
shown in Figs. 16 and 17. It is worth noting that traffic
Fig. 16 Percentage of legal links removed with two and multi-
ended wormholes
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Fig. 17 Percentage of bogus links removed with two and multi-
ended wormholes
performance impact of the removal of legal links has
been studied in more detail via simulation in [24].
4.3.2 Impact of wormhole length
Figure 18 shows the percentage of wormholes detected
for different values of wormhole length starting from
1.5 hops till 6 hops, and for η = 1, 2, 3. The results
confirm that η impacts the length of the wormhole
that can be detected. With η = 1, any wormhole can
be detected but the number of false positives will be
extremely high. With η = 3, any wormhole longer than
4 hops will be certainly detected. Similarly, the impact
of the length of the wormhole on the removal process
is shown in Fig. 19. The results show that the removal
process will be enhanced with longer wormholes. It it
worth noting that in general, wormholes will only be
a successful attack method if they capture a significant
amount of network traffic which implies they should
have a long hop count providing a significant shortcut
through the network. In the literature [16] wormholes
Fig. 18 Impact of wormhole length on wormhole detection
Fig. 19 Impact of wormhole length on wormhole removal
of lengths that are 6–10 hops are typically considered,
thus SECUND should work well in practice with a low
false positive rate.
4.3.3 Impact of node degree
With η = 3 fixed, we simulated networks with a variety
of average node degrees. The average node degree
was changed by changing the transmission range of the
nodes from 110 to 160 m. Obviously, the larger the
transmission range is, the more nodes there are that
can be reached by a given node, and hence the higher
the average node degree. A higher node degree pro-
vides more options for finding routes and improves the
performance of SECUND in general. For example, the
% of false positives performance of Detection() with
and without mutual checks is shown in Fig. 20. With an
average node degree of 5–6, the % of false positives is
very small because it is unlikely that only outlying long
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Fig. 20 False positives with detection with and without mutual
checks
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Fig. 21 Impact of node degree on links removed by mistake
routes to target nodes exist. Mutual checks further re-
duce the false positive percentages as shown in Fig. 20.
The impact of average node degree on the percentage
of legal links removed by mistake for both grid and
randomly distributed networks is presented in Fig. 21.
The trend in this case is similar to the trends with false
positives.
The impact of node degree on wormhole detection
rates is shown in Fig. 22. For both grid and randomly
distributed networks the results show that the detection
process can detect wormholes successfully even for net-
works with very low node degree (3–3.5). Even lower
node degrees (< 3) may result in nodes being unable
to find alternate routes as required by SECUND. Sim-
ilarly, an average node degree of 5 ensures that most
bogus links are removed as shown in Fig. 23.
4.3.4 Overhead analysis
The number of Detection() operations performed by
each node (for a given network topology, density, and
Fig. 22 Wormhole detection rates as a function of node degree
Fig. 23 Bogus link removal as a function of node degree
degree) impacts the average number of route acqui-
sitions each node has to employ to create a secure
neighborhood with SECUND. These statistics were
captured in our simulations (the average node degree
in the numerical results reported here is 6.8).
Figure 24 shows the average number of times each
node has to perform Detection() when mutual detection
is used and after using the rules for cooperation in
Section 3.3 to reduce the number of checks required.
These two cases are labeled “With Mutual Checks” and
“Reduced” respectively in Fig. 24. With η = 3, instead
of running Detection() 6.8 times, each node runs it
around two times after following the rules specified
for improving the detection process. The number of
route acquisitions that each node has to perform, shown
in Fig. 25, falls from around 45 to 10, a savings in
overhead of about 80%. Clearly, the rules for reducing
the number of checks presented in Section 3.3 provide
significant savings in overhead even without impact-
ing performance metrics (e.g., % of false positives, %
wormhole detection).
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Fig. 24 Detection operations performed per node
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5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we present a localized protocol SE-
CUND, that employs cooperation between neighbor-
ing nodes for creating a secure neighborhood in ad
hoc networks. SECUND employs routing hop count
discrepancies between neighbors to determine the exis-
tence of a wormhole and to remove bogus links created
by wormholes. SECUND incorporates simple rules for
cooperation that results in a small overhead in terms
of the number of links checked for wormholes. It does
not have special requirements such as location informa-
tion, very high node degree, accurate synchronization
between nodes, or special hardware. SECUND was
tested through simulations for different distributions
of nodes in networks and different types and lengths
of wormholes. Under a variety of evaluated scenarios,
SECUND demonstrated excellent wormhole detection
rate and with few false alarms. Further, the protocol
was show to be capable of removing most bogus links
from the network while removing few if any legal links.
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Appendix: Detection example in a grid network
We illustrate how the detection process works with a
grid network as on example. It is far easier to detect
wormholes in grid networks if the topology is known
a priori simply because of the increase in the number
of neighbors. We use the grid network only for the
purpose of illustrating the algorithm. The process works
for random topologies and perturbed grids as well,
as shown in Section 4. Consider Fig. 26 that shows a
Fig. 26 Example of a grid network
grid network where the grid spacing is d. If we ignore
d, we can use integer coordinates for nodes in two
dimensions. In Fig. 26, the bottom-leftmost node has
coordinates (0,0). We assume that the ranges of nodes
are such that each node has exactly four neighbors
(those that are at a distance d from a node) as shown in
the figure. Let a wormhole exist with its endpoints hav-
ing the the same range as regular nodes. Let end-point
M1 be located at coordinates (m1,x, m1,y) such that
m < m1,x < m + 1 and n > m1,y > n − 1. Let the other
end-point M2 be located at coordinates (m2,x, m2,y)
such that p > m2,x > p + 1 and q < m2,y < q − 1. Since
m, n, p, q can be anything, this does not lose any gener-
ality although we assume p > m and q < n by at least a
few hops in what follows. We can observe the following
properties for this scenario.
1. Given a node with coordinates (m, n), it can only
reach nodes at (m, n − 1), (m, n + 1), (m − 1, n)
and (m + 1, n) when there is no wormhole.
2. The true shortest path between a node at (m, n)
and a node at (p, q) has |p − m| + |q − n| hops.
In Fig. 26, (m, n) = (2, 8) and (p, q) = (8, 3). The
shortest path between these nodes is 6 + 5 = 11
hops.
3. The set NM1 consists of nodes with coordinates
(m, n), (m + 1, n),(m, n − 1),(m +1, n − 1). The set
NM2 consists of nodes with coordinates (p, q), (p −
1, q), (p, q + 1), (p − 1, q + 1).
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4. The wormhole physically spans a physical dis-
tance of d = √(mx,1 − mx,2)2 + (my,1 − my,2)2, but
the minimum number of true hops between any
node ∈ NM1 and any node ∈ NM2 is |m − p| + 2 +
|n − q| + 2 hops. This is the shortest path from the
node at (m + 1, n − 1) to the node at (p − 1, q + 1).
In the example in Fig. 26, this is 7 hops.
Let us suppose that a node A at (m, n) is check-
ing its link with a node B at (p, q) to see if a
wormhole is in its vicinity. When the node A at
(m, n) initially asks for its neighbors, it gets responses
from nodes at: (m, n − 1), (m, n + 1), (m − 1, n), (m +
1, n), (p, q), (p − 1, q), (p, q + 1), (p − 1, q + 1). If we
identify nodes by their coordinates:
– NA = {(m, n −1), (m, n + 1), (m −1, n), (m + 1, n),
(p, q), (p − 1, q), (p, q + 1), (p − 1, q + 1)}
– NˆA = (m, n −1), (m, n +1), (m − 1, n), (m +1, n)}
– N∗A = {(p, q), (p − 1, q), (p, q + 1), (p − 1, q + 1)}.
Similarly, NB = {(p, q + 1), (p, q − 1), (p − 1, q), (p +
1, q), (m, n), (m+1, n), (m, n−1), (m+1, n−1)}. From
this, we can see that NB − NA = {(p + 1, q), (p, q −
1), (m + 1, n − 1)}. The target node T that is picked
by A belongs to this set, i.e., T ∈ {(p + 1, q), (p, q −
1), (m + 1, n − 1)}. Node A will ask the nodes in NA
to find routes to T avoiding nodes in NA and NB and
having at least one intermediate node. We see there are
three cases:
– Case 1: If T = (p + 1, q), the lengths of routes will
be as shown in Table 4 (assuming p > m and q <
n—otherwise absolute values of the differences will
have to be used). Unless p − m + n − q + 2 < η +
3, the wormhole will most certainly be detected.
– Case 2: If T = (p, q − 1), a similar tabulation of
routes indicates that the longest route is still p −
m + n − q + 2 hops long and a similar conclusion is
reached. We do not tabulate the length of routes in
this case.
– Case 3: If T = (m + 1, n − 1), the lengths of routes
will be as shown in Table 5. In this case, the worm-
Table 4 Lengths of routes to T = (p + 1, q)
Node in NA Length of route to T
(m, n − 1) p − m + n − q
(m, n + 1) p − m + n − q + 2
(m − 1, n) p − m + n − q + 2
(m + 1, n) p − m + n − q + 2
(p, q) Not possible
(p − 1, q) 6
(p, q + 1) 2
(p − 1, q + 1) 5
Table 5 Lengths of routes to T = (m + 1, n − 1)
Node in NA Length of route to T
(m, n − 1) 3
(m, n + 1) 5
(m − 1, n) 3
(m + 1, n) 3
(p, q) Not possible
(p − 1, q) p − m + n − q − 3
(p, q + 1) p − m + n − q − 3
(p − 1, q + 1) p − m + n − q − 4
hole is detected as long as p − m + n − q − 3 >
η + 3.
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